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Abstract
Many Expert Systems for intelligent electronic device (IED) performance analyses such
as those for protective relays have been developed to ascertain operations, maximize
availability,  and  subsequently  minimize  misoperation  risks.  However,  manual
handling of overwhelming volume of relay resident big data and heavy dependence on
the protection experts’  contrasting knowledge and inundating relay manuals  have
hindered the maintenance of the Expert Systems. Thus, the objective of this chapter is
to study the design of an Expert System called Protective Relay Analysis System (PRAY),
which is imbedded with a rule base construction module. This module is to provide the
facility of intelligently maintaining the knowledge base of PRAY through the prior
discovery of relay operations (association) rules from a novel integrated data mining
approach  of  Rough-Set-Genetic-Algorithm-based  rule  discovery  and  Rule  Quality
Measure. The developed PRAY runs its relay analysis by, first, validating whether a
protective relay under test operates correctly as expected by way of comparison between
hypothesized and actual relay behavior. In the case of relay maloperations or misoper‐
ations,  it  diagnoses  presented  symptoms  by  identifying  their  causes.  This  study
illustrates  how,  with  the  prior  hybrid-data-mining-based  knowledge  base  mainte‐
nance of an Expert System, regular and rigorous analyses of protective relay perform‐
ances carried out by power utility entities can be conveniently achieved.
Keywords: association rule, data mining, digital protective relay, expert system, pow‐
er system protection analysis, rough set theory
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1. Introduction
According to the IEEE Working Group D10 of the Line Protection Subcommittee, Power System
Relaying Committee, Expert Systems have been proposed since early 1980s to be potential tools
for engineers to develop intelligent performance analysis systems for the intelligent electronic
devices (IEDs) such as protective relays [1]. Some of the works where protection performance
analyses can be identified are in the area of offline tasks such as settings coordination, post‐
fault analysis, and fault diagnosis [2–13].
Kezunovic et al. [6] explain the substation automated fault analysis using Expert System
method based on the retrieved disturbance data acquired by digital fault recorders (DFRs).
This fault analysis helps protection engineers identify the correctness of protective relay
operation. Figure 1 illustrates the block diagram of the Expert System. The knowledge base in
the CLIPS (an Expert System shell) rules used in the forward chaining inference engine using
processed data is built by interviewing experts, using an empirical approach based on
Electromagnetic Transient Program (EMTP) simulation and utilizing actual big field substa‐
tion data.
Figure 1. The Expert System block diagram [6].
Luo and Kezunovic’s [10] implementation of the Expert System in automated protection
analysis is more specifically tailored at detailed analysis of a specific protective relay by relying
on recorded big data found only within it. Figure 2 illustrates the block diagram of the analysis
system created based on CLIPS language within Visual C++ framework. The analysis system
is developed revolving around the strategy of comparing predicted (hypothesized) and actual
(factual) protection operation in terms of statuses and corresponding timings of logic operands.
Any matching between the predicted and actual protection operations validates the correct‐
ness of the actual status and timing of that operand. Otherwise, certain misoperation is
identified, and diagnosis is initiated to trace the reasons. Predicted statuses and timings of
active logic operands are basically a hypothesization of relay operations, which is done by way
of forward chaining reasoning. They form the knowledge base in the rules used in the CLIPS
inference engine.
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Figure 2. The Expert System block diagram for validation and diagnosis of protective relay [10].
Figure 3. Structure of Expert System for protection coordination [13].
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Tuitemwong and Premrudeepreechacharn [13] implement ES analysis for improving protec‐
tion coordination settings of protective devices in distribution system under the presence of
distributed generators (DG). By way of selecting suitable protection coordination settings, this
analysis system determines the correct protection system performance in a DG-present power
distribution system. The proposed structure of ES is shown in Figure 3. The inference engine
uses coordination rules and selection rules to generate satisfactory coordination settings based
on the processed equipment data, circuit data, protection data, and DG data in the knowledge
base. In the case of conflicting settings, the user can make his own decision. The rules are set
for the specific distribution system protection and maybe changed when necessary.
The common problem with the aforementioned implementation of rule-based Expert System
in protection system analysis is the difficult upgrading of its knowledge base that is made up
of “if-then” rules used for decision-making inference engine. Upgrading by expansion and
refinement are necessary so as to adapt the Expert System to the continuously changing power
network topologies, protection strategies, and multiplicity in protective relay functions [14].
However, acquiring knowledge of relay operation characteristics for upgrading of the
knowledge base has not been an easy task due to
i. the burdensome manual handling of voluminous protective relay stored data and
ii. the heavy dependence on the protection experts’ differing knowledge and inundating
relay manuals.
It is beneficial if a novel technique could be formulated so as to relieve the untoward effort
needed to acquire knowledge in building and maintaining the knowledge base. This technique
should allow adjustment of knowledge base by training a protective relay device for as many
disturbances as exhaustively possible in order to produce a complete inventory of rules. To
help realize this, the authors’ previous work of an integrated data mining approach under the
Knowledge Discovery in Database (KDD) framework shall be the prior step before the eventual
Expert System knowledge base upgrading strategy is subsequently performed [15–17].
2. Integrated data mining approach to hypothesize expected relay
behavior from recorded relay event report
Under the KDD framework, Othman et al. [15–17] investigate the implementation of a novel
integrated data mining approach under supervised learning in order to discover the knowl‐
edge (or “hypothesize”) and the expected relay behavior. This knowledge extraction from the
resident large event reports of a digital distance protective relay comes in the form of associ‐
ation rules as shown in Figure 4. The integrated data mining encompasses the adoption of the
following computational intelligence methods:
i. Rough set theory: Used to select the minimal subsets (i.e., reduction) of attributes
while maintaining the original syntax of the relay’s big data of event report.
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ii. Genetic algorithm: Used to explore the optimal sets of the above subsets of reduced
attributes from which simple yet accurate prediction rules (i.e., decision algorithm)
can be constructed.
iii. Rule quality measure: Used to extract the pertinent association rule from a host of the
above original population of prediction rules to determine tripping logic of relay
upon fault detection. This is what is referred as hypothesization of protective relay
operation. This final version of knowledge representation shall be the main constit‐
uent for the Expert System knowledge base.
Figure 4. Data mining analysis steps in hypothesizing distance relay operation characteristics from big relay event da‐
ta.
In the study, the large event report is a PSCAD-simulated raw operation recording of an
AREVA-modeled distance protective relay as shown in Table 1 (only a portion of time events
is shown to reduce page usage). This big data, which is prior to data preparation, is a repre‐
Novel Rule Base Development from IED-Resident Big Data for Protective Relay Analysis Expert System
http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/63756
5
sentation of the relay’s decision system (DS) for zone 1 A–G fault—the so-called predata-
preparation DS [18].
Table 1. Predata-preparation of distance protective relay’s decision system for zone 1 A-G fault (only a portion of
attribute columns (from a total of 108) and time events are shown to reduce page usage).
The decision system is an information table of event report that can be considered as a pair of
finite and nonempty set (U, A). U is the universe of objects (i.e., time tagged relay events tn,
Big Data on Real-World Applications6
thus called event report) and A is the set of attributes {e.g., ir, irp, vam, iam, ibm, icm, CB52a_B,
CB52b_B, VTmcb_B, CRZ4, pg_Z3PkUp, pg_Z4PkUp, pp_Z1PkUp, pp_Z2PkUp, AGflt, c50_Z1,
b50_Z3, Dist_ab_Z2, pg_TrpZ1f, TrpBOPZ1, WI_CRTrp, Trip_PhA, etc.}. Each attribute a∈A
defines an information function such that, fa: U → Va, where Va is the set of values of the attribute
a, called the domain of a. For instance, the set of values of the attribute pg_Z1PkUp (the “zone
1 ground distance pick-up” element) is expressed as pg_Z1PkUp: U → {0, 1}, which defines the
relay element’s active states according to the presence of ground fault in the protected section
of transmission line (i.e., no-fault present or zone-1-ground-fault present).
Table 2. The predata-mining DS of distance protective relay subjected to zone 1 A-G fault.
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Here, A is A = C ∪ D which is a nonempty finite union set of condition and decision attributes
(condition attributes ci ⊂ C suggest the multifunctional protective elements and analog
measurands while decision attribute di ⊂ D suggests the relay’s trip output).
This big data is a hindrance in a laborious manual extraction of relay operation characteristics
for the Expert System development. Thus, the aforementioned novel integrated data mining
strategy is necessary to address this issue.
The resulting prepared decision table (after data selection, preprocessing, and transformation)
of the distance protective relay's decision system is shown in Table 2. It is also called postdata-
preparation DS or predata-mining DS. “.” denotes data patterns that are similar to events
immediately before and after them. Thus, they are not presented in order to reduce the table
dimension. It is noticeable that the number of attributes has been substantially reduced by the
data preparation strategy to merely 46 from the original 108 in the large raw event report.
The important analysis steps in the framework of Rough Set based data mining for deriving
the distance relay decision algorithm from its event database is illustrated in Figure 4 and
discussed herewith.
The computation of reducts which is a process of reducing the number attributes while still
maintaining the original data syntax is performed to start with. Within this the following
substeps are executed:
a. Computation of the D-discernibility matrix of C (denoted as ). An element of
 is defined as the set of all condition attributes which discern events ti and tj and
do not belong to the same equivalence class of the relation U|IND(D).
b. Subsequent derivation of the discernibility function fC(D) in Conjunctive Normal Form
(CNF) (also called POS form in Boolean algebra) from MC(D). The CNF is reduced to final
form after absorption law and omission of duplicates of disjunctive terms (sums) are
applied minus the multiplication among each of the disjunctive terms of the final CNF.
c. In empirical database such as in this relay event data analysis, the calculation toward
arriving at the final Disjunctive Normal Form (DNF) in order to find the eventual reducts
is extremely computationally intensive. (DNF is obtained if the multiplication among each
of the disjunctive terms of the final CNF is performed). In this case, the generation of
reducts is considered as an NP-hard problem [19]. Thus, Genetic Algorithm is adopted to
compute approximations of reducts by finding the minimally approximate hitting sets
(analogous to reducts) from the sets corresponding to the discernibility function [20, 21].
Next prediction rules (denoted as ) are generated in which the above discovered reducts
serve as the templates for the prediction rules to be created from. This is principally done by
superimposing each reduct in the reduct set over the original decision table DS and then
reading off the domain values of the condition and decision attributes. The resulting logical
patterns, denoted as ), that relate descriptions of condition to decision classes shall have
the representation shown in Eq. (1):
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: IF AND AND THENi k
pred
i c k c TripC D c v c v Trip vÞ = ¼ = = (1)
These prediction rules that are an exact representation of the characteristics of the relay
decision system (table) DS can be described as the relay decision algorithm and can be
designated as ALG(DS), i.e.,
( ) ( )pred ttALG DS C DÎÈ= ÞU (2)
where (C ⇒
pred
D)t  is the set of minimal prediction rules C ⇒
pred
D for an event t ∈ ∪, i.e.,
( ) ( ): IF AND AND THEN ( )( ) i ki c k
pred
T ipt c rC D c v t c v t Trip v t= ¼ = =Þ (3)
This ALG(DS) can be evaluated for its accuracy as follows:
a. The entire original relay data set DS is partitioned into training and test sets using k-fold
cross validation technique.
b. Estimating classification performance of the relay decision algorithm by rule firing-voting
strategies.
The discovered ALG(DS) has been evaluated and verified by Othman et al. [15–17] to be able
to be used to predict and discriminate future relay events having unknown trip state in
unsupervised learning. This evaluation is necessary prior to allowing the eventual deduction
of the relay association rule to take place.
Finally, postpruning (or filtering) is performed on the generated prediction rules (C ⇒
pred
D) so as
to discover relay association rules (denoted as C ⇒
pred
D). These pertinent association rules
essentially characterize the tripping decision logic of protective relay upon fault detection. This
has been referred at the outset as the hypothesization of protective relay operation. This final
version of knowledge representation shall be the main constituent for the Expert System
knowledge base.
Because there are too large prediction rules to be filtered from, it is difficult to manually
determine which rules are more useful, interesting, or important. Therefore, a measure of rule
quality called G2 Likelihood Ratio Statistic as well as a measure of rule interestingness are used
to select the most appropriate relay association rules and filter away the unwanted ones.
As mentioned above, these finally discovered relay association rules essentially describe the
logical pattern of the correlating descriptions of conditions (i.e., C, the attribute set for various
multifunctional protection elements) and the decision class (i.e., D, the attribute for trip
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assertion status). Thus, the symbol CD is used to illustrate C-D association and “CD-association
rule” has been labeled as such to recognize it.
The final CD-association rule for one such fault condition as zone 1 A–G fault is shown in Eq.
(4). Different fault condition would provide correspondingly different association rules to
describe the relay’s behavior.
(123)AND 52 _ (closed)AND _ (123)
AND (AGflt)AND 50 _ 3(A)
AND 50 _ 4(A)AND 50 _ 1(A)AND 
p50_Z3(A)AND 50(1234)AND 32(Fwd)AND
(0)AND 50(1234)AND _ (123)AND _ (1) (A)
Zag CB A pg PkUp
FltType pp Z
pp Z p Z
r Q




It is important to note that Eq. (4) defines the necessary triggering of the required relay
multifunctional protective elements (antecedent) in order to recognize the zone 1 phase-A-to-
ground fault and consequently assert the trip signal (consequent) to open pole A of the circuit
breaker concerned. This is what the protection engineers would like to know in understanding
the domain of the distance relay in responding to the fault.
Thus, it is necessary to verify how true it is that this rule can be used to interpret the distance
relay behavior subjected to zone 1 A–G fault as represented by the predata-mining DS in Table
2. Out of all the relay events in the entire length of the relay event report, relay events t90and
t91 identified as the fault detection and trip signal assertion instances, respectively, will be our
emphasis for cross reference to verify the exactness of the above-mentioned rationalized CD-
association rule. In Table 2, the rule is seen to be an exact interpretation of the relay events t90and
t91. Thus, the discovered rationalized CD-association rule is verified.
The eventually discovered (C ⇒
assoc
D), and thus the desired hypothesis, has been proven to be an
exact manifestation of the relay operation characteristics hidden in the event report [15–17].
The intelligent data mining framework provides the potential facility to conveniently discover
exhaustively available knowledge of relay behavior from big event data subjected to exhaus‐
tively possible fault contingencies. Ultimately, a complete rule base for inference execution of
an Expert System for relay operation analysis can be developed. This is the motivation of
developing an Expert System called Protective Relay Analysis System (PRAY) that provides
a platform for gathering previously discovered rules for its knowledge base construction.
3. Developing protective relay analysis system (PRAY) expert system
The concept of protective relay performance analysis is related to the convention that in any
analysis known or correct events must first be hypothesized (expected operations are as‐
sumed), then an analysis is performed to confirm (validate) or refute the hypothesis by running
matching exercise between expected and actual operations of the device under test [22]. If it is
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determined that the protective relay operation was incorrect, the diagnosis for cause must be
performed [8]. This fundamental concept shall form the very basis of developing PRAY for
distance protection.
PRAY is developed as an application tool under LabVIEW framework from National Instru‐
ments [23]. The main components of PRAY are as shown in Figure 5 and described as follows:
Figure 5. Architecture of Protective Relay Analysis System (PRAY).
i. Construction of a rule base for PRAY’s inference engine by collating as an array all
relay CD-association rules discovered from the KDD processes performed on trained
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relay. All attributes of each rule in the rule base shall be time tagged and arranged in
a chronological order so that validation and diagnosis of the analyzed relay’s
operations can be presented in an apparent operations logical sequence.
ii. Construction of phase and ground distance impedance channels (attributes) and
fault-type channel. Using these channels, further identification processes of fault
type, faulted zone, and distance to fault are executed and later used in singling out
the most suitable relay CD-association rule from the rule base.
iii. Inferring, from the rule base according to both impending fault type and zone of pick-
up, an expected relay CD-association rule to be best chosen as a hypothesis for the
prediction of operations logic of the relay under analysis.
iv. Validation of occurrence of protective element pick-ups and their correctness of
operations against hypothesis of the selected relay CD-association rule.
v. Symptom of relay element misoperation and its diagnosis as well as possible solution
suggestion.
vi. Graphical plots of ground and phase impedance locus against respective ground and
phase distance quadrilateral characteristics. The distance characteristics are con‐
structed based on parameter settings taken from the relay under analysis. Instanta‐
neous filtered voltages and currents and logic operands are also plotted.
3.1. PRAY inputs
The different inputs needed by PRAY for its analysis functions are as follows:
i. Relay CD-association rules: These rules saved as a plain text format in the KDD
process are collated via graphical user interface (GUI) dialog input. The user is
prompted for sufficient number of rules to be imported. The collated rules are
converted into an array to form a rule base for the Expert System inference engine.
Each rule input is an outcome of KDD after the Rough-Set-and-Genetic-Algorithm-
based data mining and Rule Quality Measure (G2 Likelihood Ratio Statistic) in
ROSETTA [24]. In its untreated form, each rule input consists of a number of sub-
CD-association rules. These subrules are rationalized into a single C ⇒ D form by
taking conjunction of them and using the concept of Boolean function manipulation
by applying law of absorption.
ii. Analyzed relay event reports in the form of raw and prepared decision systems, (relay
DSs): The raw relay DS is a converted data from relay resident IEEE COMTRADE
format to DIAdem native format (.tdm), which is needed for processing in LabVIEW
[25]. The prepared relay DS is a resultant file after the same data preparation process
as that in the KDD for trained relay. This prepared relay DS in DIAdem format (.tdm)
is of the same data structure as that used in the KDD; the latter is ready for the Rough
Set data mining albeit not executed on for the expert system analysis. Having the
same data structure is important so that the prepared DS of the relay under analysis
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can be correctly cross validated with a CD-association rule chosen from the PRAY
rule base.
iii. Protection parameter settings: Imbedded as a separate “channel group” from the raw
relay DS’s channel group in the same tdm file. The relay settings are originally
recorded by the relay under analysis as a number of COMTRADE files. Since they
are in the same file as the raw relay DS, they are also converted by DIAdem into tdm
format.
iv. Performance specifications: The user has the option to key in values for parameters.
For simplicity of analysis, TNB specifications for relay tripping time according to
various zones of protection have been included as default values without requiring
user’s inputs. (TNB is a short form for Tenaga Nasional Berhad, a Malaysian major
utility organization.)
3.2. PRAY reasoning strategy for validation and diagnosis
The reasoning for validation and diagnosis of relay operations analysis starts with identifica‐
tion of fault type, faulted zone, and distance to fault by PRAY itself. The information from the
fault type and picked-up faulted zone is then used to determine the index in the rule base array
to determine the subarray containing the appropriate relay CD-association rule to be used in
analyzing the relay under analysis. This chosen rule shall act as the hypothesis of anticipated
operations of individual protective elements in the relay under analysis when a particular fault
has occurred. All the antecedents and consequent in the rule have been initially arranged in
sequential order during the rule base construction according to the time instances that have
been tagged alongside them. Time tagging is important so that validation and diagnosis of
relay operations can be executed according to the logical sequence stipulated by the hypoth‐
esis. This logical sequence is in fact indicative of relay operations logic. The following is a






0.107 Dist_bg(123) Zbg(123) pg_PkUp(123) pg_Trp(1)
0.108 Trip(B)
The consequent Trip(B) is associated with antecedents occurring beforehand. Any protective
elements (antecedents) on the same row having the same time tagging indicate that they pick
up (or stay in certain states) in concurrence. Expectedly, the last row having the highest tagged
time must be the consequent (decision attribute) Trip(B).
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The validation strategy of the operations of the analyzed relay starts by iterating through all
antecedents in the hypothesis and comparing each one with that of the corresponding attribute
of the prepared DS of the relay under analysis. Matched values result in messages describing
the correctness of operations of the respective protective elements. On the other hand, any
differences in the cross matches (either due to wrong pick-up values or nonassertion of the
respective protective elements) will produce messages describing the relay’s failed elements.
The result of the validation is presented starting from the consequent (decision attribute,
“Trip”) at the top followed by antecedents arranged in descending sequence according to the
order of the time tags in the hypothesis.
Diagnosis is carried out on failed, inoperative or misoperative protective elements. To view
the cause–effect of events, a hierarchical tree is constructed based on the hypothesis where
nodes are all hierarchically time sequenced, increasing in time from downstream nodes toward
root node. The root node (top most) is the consequent of all the downstream antecedent nodes.
Antecedents at the same nodes (i.e., having the same indentation) are concurrent in time














4. PRAY analysis system results
In the rule base construction of PRAY, each of the imported CD-association rules, prior to being
rationalized using the concept of Boolean function manipulation by applying the law of
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absorption, would be formatted by ROSETTA into a text file. When imported into PRAY, the
file will be cleared of all unnecessary data such as comments and rule interestingness numerical
measures leaving only the required relay CD-association rules for subsequent rationalization.
Figure 6 illustrates the GUI for the constructed rule base. Size of rule base and the selected
subarray (0-indexed) of collated rule base array are shown. The size of the rule base reflects
the number of training of various fault contingencies the trained relay has been subjected to.
Figure 6. GUI for constructed rule base.
Figure 7 illustrates the GUI for analysis of a distance protective relay operation that has been
subjected to a zone-1-AG fault. Using data in the relay’s raw tdm file, PRAY discovered that
an AG fault has indeed occurred in zone 1 of the relay under analysis at approximately 39 km
from its location in the substation. From this information, an appropriate relay CD-association
rule has been chosen and displayed in the GUI. This rule shall be used to analyze whether any
appropriate measures have been taken by the relay under analysis to clear the fault. In
validating the individual operations of protective elements, the Validation field displays the
correctness of actions taken by the relay after cross matching anticipated operations of
individual protective elements hypothesized by the rule with the corresponding attributes
obtained from the preprocessed tdm relay file under analysis. The consequent “Trip” is
validated to have correctly sent a pole A trip signal to the circuit breaker. This is followed by
correct antecedent statuses arranged in descending sequence according to the hypothesis. The
relay tripping time of 1.2 ms is compliant with the TNB requirement of 25 ms for zone 1
operation. The circuit breaker operating time and fault clearance time are also displayed in the
GUI.
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Figure 7. GUI for analysis of distance protective relay operations.
Figure 8. GUI for ground distance quadrilateral characteristics plots.
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Figure 8 shows the graphical plots of ground impedance locus against respective ground
distance quadrilateral characteristics. Since the fault is AG occurring in zone 1, it is noted that
only trajectory of Zag traverses through into zone 1 of the ground quadrilateral characteristics
and all phase impedances stay as outliers of the phase quadrilateral characteristics as expected.
Figure 9. Validation of misoperative relay.
Figure 9 illustrates a screenshot of PRAY’s validation for a distance relay that had failed to
operate (maloperated) when the transmission line it was protecting was subjected to a zone-1-
AG fault. PRAY discovered that an AG fault had occurred in one of the relays under analysis
at approximately 40 km forward its location in the substation. (This is actually the same fault
occurred in the above analysis of the same relay operating successfully.) From this information,
an appropriate relay CD-association rule had been chosen as the hypothesis (similar to the
above) and used to validate that appropriate measures had not been taken to clear the fault.
The consequent “Trip” was validated to have not sent a pole-A trip signal to the circuit breaker.
The descending sequence of antecedents indicated that although there were correct operations
of negative sequence overcurrent (Q50) and residual overcurrent supervision (r50) elements,
signifying the impending A–G imbalanced fault, the zone-1 overcurrent supervision element
(p50_Z1) had failed to do likewise. This was believed to have attributed to the relay’s failure
to trip. Looking at the operation logic of different protective elements at different levels of
sequence in the Diagnosis field’s hierarchical tree, it is apparent that the failure by the
overcurrent element p50_Z1 is diagnosed to be the possible cause of the relay maloperation.
Finding the symptom related to the malfunctional p50_Z1 element as shown in Figure 10
reveals that an incorrect threshold setting could have caused its failure.
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Figure 10. Diagnosis of misoperative relay.
5. Summary
The developed Protective Relay Analysis (PRAY) Expert System has demonstrated how the
problems related to the maintenance of rule base of an Expert System can be addressed. By
collating all the necessary relay CD-association rules discovered previously from the earlier
KDD processes involving integrated-Rough-Set-and-Genetic-Algorithm data mining, Rule
Quality Measure, and rule interestingness and importance judgments (as discussed in the
authors’ cited works), a maintainable knowledge base for inference strategy can be conven‐
iently prepared. Although this study revolves around analyzing a modeled distance relay’s
big event data by hypothesis discovery, validation, and diagnosis, it is envisaged that using
this approach a more rigorous analysis implementation of actual protective relay of different
types can be embarked on.
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Nomenclature
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C rule condition attribute(s)
CB52_B status of circuit breaker.
C ⇒ D
relay decision rule, general term for (C ⇒
assoc





D) relay CD-association rule
(C ⇒
pred
D) relay CD-prediction rule
CD-association rule  a relay association rule associating between C and D
CD-decision alg. a set of relay prediction rules that predict D from C (alg. is algorithm)
CD-prediction rule   rule that predicts D from C
CNF conjunctive normal form (i.e., product of sum (POS) in Boolean algebra).
COMTRADE common format for transient data exchange, an IEEE file format
D rule decision attribute
Dist_bg zone of Gnd Dist flt (ground distance fault)
DNF disjunctive normal form (i.e., sum of product (SOP) in Boolean algebra)




G2 G2 Likelihood ratio statistic, a rule quality measure
IS information system
KDD Knowledge discovery in database
MC(D) D-discernibility matrix of C
p50_Z1 phase overcurrent supervision in zone
pg_PkUp ground distance pick-up
pg_Trp ground distance trip
PRAY Protective relay analysis system, an Expert System
Q32 negative sequence directionality
Q50 zone having NonDir Neq Seq OvrCurrt (nondirectional negative sequence overcurrent)
r50 residual overcurrent supervision in zone
REDD(C) D-reducts of C, sets of reduced number of indispensable attributes
RST Rough set theory
M (fC(D)) multiset
M (fC(D))Min Hit Set minimal hitting set
SOP sum of products
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Trip relay pole trip signals
U|IND(D) indiscernibility-relation/equivalence-class/elementary-sets about universe of relay events U with
respect to D
Zbg zone of ground distance pick-up.
Zload impedance encroaching load characteristic
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